국제환경규범의 내생적 결정과정에 관한 연구

Abstract

This study presents the political economics models to explore the political landscape of special interest groups influencing the government’s decision making process for implementing international environmental standard. Starting with the popular menu-auction types of lobbying frameworks in the literature, the study extends its researching scope to multi-principal and multi-agency based international interest group politics and its hybrid case in order to bring the interaction of the relevant interest politics to the fore. Within a specific factor model of international trade, we compare the political equilibrium outcomes in different institutional frameworks which can be feasible in the sense of recently growing role of environmental groups. In the benchmark, the two governments do not cooperate and the unilateral implementation leads to environmental standards that are too lax. Cooperation between the two governments can internalize the negative externality associated with unilateral policy making. This framework is more elaborated by incorporating the case of clean technology transfer between countries, which can benefit mutually both the donor and the recipient countries. More importantly, it is shown that cooperation between like-minded interest groups in different countries generates an identical result obtainable in the negotiation between the two governments. It is found that comparative static analysis using simulations provides some supporting evidence for the findings in the political economics models.