온실가스 감축의무 협상동향 및 대응방향 연구 I

Title
온실가스 감축의무 협상동향 및 대응방향 연구 I
Authors
김용건
Co-Author
김이진; 박시원
Issue Date
2009-12-31
Publisher
한국환경정책·평가연구원
Series/Report No.
녹색성장연구보고서 : 2009-07
Page
236 p.
URI
http://repository.kei.re.kr/handle/2017.oak/19432
Language
한국어
Abstract
Climate Change Negotiations for the Post-Kyoto Regime Key Issues and Implications I International efforts against global warming have been taken place since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janerio in 1992. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, was the first international agreement to impose binding targets for industrial countries and eastern European countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Since the Kyoto Protocol took effect in 2005, the international negotiations on how to implement the Convention and the Protocol have been full-fledged. The 13th session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali, Indonesia, adopted Bali Action Plan and launched a new set of negotiation processes for the post-2012 climate change regime. As Bali Action Plan mandated the negotiation process to be concluded at its 15th session in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009, it is imperative to study key issues and implications of climate change negotiations for the post-2012 regime. Korea's economy is particularly vulnerable to any internationally binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions, as it is heavily dependent on energy-intensive industries and import-dependent energy sources. Accordingly, scientific analysis and understanding of key issues and implications of recent developments of the UN climate change negotiations are of utmost importance to Korea's economy and policy design. This study analyzes the economic impact of various emission targets currently under discussion in the international community and provides policy advice with regard to future climate change negotiations. A series of five negotiation conferences had been held in 2009 before Copenhagen(COP15); however, the wide division between the developed and the developing countries had not been narrowed until the last day of the two-week long conference. As a result, the Copenhagen meeting failed to produce a legally binding agreement for the post-2012 climate regime and instead provided a political agreement entitled the “Copenhagen Accord” that was reached through a closed-door negotiation led by the heads of 28 nations. While the Accord received criticism due to the lack of procedural transparency, it earned credits in that it drew the consensus among the world's largest emitters, like the US and China, who had been reluctant to participate in global mitigation actions. The Copenhagen Accord includes the target of limiting global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial level and promises the delivery of short-term and mid-term financial aid to developing countries. It is however unclear how the targets will be achieved. What the accord also lacks are agreements on some of most critical issues, including the continuity of the Kyoto Protocol, the legal nature of an agreed outcome, individual mitigation targets, the comparability of efforts among developed countries, and the compliance systems. Two-track negotiations, one under the Convention and the other under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-LCA and AWG-KP), were granted to be extended until the next Conference of Parties (COP16) scheduled in Mexico at the end of 2010. Accordingly, these remaining issues will be continued to be discussed in negotiation meetings up to COP16. As the legal standing of Copenhagen Accord remains uncertain, there are some possible scenarios on post-Copenhagen negotiations and their outcomes. The first scenario is that the Kyoto Protocol will be sustained along with the Copenhagen Accord. In this case, the Kyoto Protocol continues to bind Annex I country Parties (except the US) while the Copenhagen Accord focuses on the mitigation activities of the US and developing countries. Based on the result of the Copenhagen meeting, the probability of this scenario has decreased. The second scenario is that future negotiations will actively flesh out the Copenhagen Accord and lead to an official adoption of the accord as a legally binding instrument at COP16, replacing the Kyoto Protocol. The third scenario is that future negotiations will continue to be in a deadlock over some of critical agenda items, and not adopt the accord as a legally binding agreement at COP16. This may mean that the UN's role will be limited to containing the domestic pledges of each country while lacking any compliance mechanism to ensure if and how these pledges are being met. Multilateral meetings among major countries such as the G20 or MEF may develop into major forums for discussing climate change issues under this scenario. Based on the foregoing scenarios, the followings are some of the important implications of the Copenhagen meeting that the Korean government may consider for its future negotiations. Firstly, the Copenhagen Accord positively reflects Korea's positions throughout the negotiations over the past two years for the following reasons. First, it maintains the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries for mitigation commitments, thus decreasing international pressure on Korea to join the Annex I countries. Second, it recognizes unilateral mitigation actions by developing countries without international support. Third, it provides a different measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) system for such unilateral mitigation actions. These three features included in the accord were among the most important agenda items that the Korean negotiation delegates have put forward. Accordingly, Korea should strive to give the Copenhagen Accord full legal standing at COP16 so that it has a stable legal status for the post-2012 climate regime. Korea will need to submit its domestic target to the UNFCCC Secretariat by the end of January 2010 as stipulated in the accord and actively engage itself in the negotiation processes until COP16. For legal stability and certainty, the Copenhagen Accord is better to be adopted as a new Protocol, rather than a COP Decision. Secondly, the Copenhagen Accord uses the term of "developed and developing countries" for financial aid commitment instead of "Annex I and non-Annex I countries" as used for mitigation commitment. This difference in terminology suggests that Korea, a non-Annex I country, yet arguably a developed country, may be subject to strong pressure from the Annex I countries to contribute to financial aid for developing countries. The agreement on a fair and reasonable share among donating countries will be a major issue in the negotiation. Thirdly, the Copenhagen Accord briefly mentions the different levels of MRV among developed and developing countries without going into detail. Accordingly, future negotiations will concentrate on how to operationalize the terminological difference in actions. In particular, the term “international consultation and analysis” shall be materialized in reality to meet the fine balance between international review and national sovereignty. Furthermore, Korea's domestic mitigation target (30% emissions reductions from business as usual by 2020) is proven to be comparable with other countries, including some of most developed countries. Korea will need to actively convey to negotiating partners that Korea's voluntary target is among the highest level of comparable efforts. It should be emphasized that imposing the same level of mitigation targets based on the emission level at a certain reference year is highly unfair. The importance of the BAU reference should be reinforced as well. The difficulty regarding the BAU reference is a technicality, which can be overcome by using various authoritative research data released by international organizations such as the EIA and the IEA. This study indicates that Korea's BAU target appears higher than that of the US and EU. Given the higher mitigation costs compared to other developed countries, Korea's level of ambition should be given due credit. It is also important to clarify that historical emissions per capita (responsibility indicator) and GDP per capita (capability indicator) should be fully reflected in setting mitigation targets for countries with different circumstances. Finally, it is important to note that Korea may face various legal, economic, and diplomatic conflicts with other countries, particularly with advanced economies such as the US and EU even though its domestic emission targets may be purely voluntary with no international sanctions attached. In particular, it is worth emphasizing that Korea's economic impact will depend heavily on the level of China's mitigation efforts. Korea should therefore actively engage itself in and closely coordinate with various major multilateral meetings concerning climate change in which China's mitigation policies are being discussed and evaluated.

Table Of Contents



제1장 서 론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 주요 연구내용
3. 기대효과
제2장 온실가스 감축의무 협상동향
1. 기후변화협약 및 후속 협상동향
2. 발리행동계획 채택이후 협상동향
3. 2009년 기후변화협상회의 동향
가. 코펜하겐 제15차 당사국총회 이전 협상동향
1) 회의개요 및 전체동향
2) 핵심 의제별 주요내용 및 쟁점사항
3) 주요국의 제안 및 평가
4) 협상 관련 법적 이슈
나. 코펜하겐 제15차 당사국총회 협상동향
제3장 온실가스 감축의무 협상에 관한 연구 현황
1. 국가 간 감축의무 할당 기준 및 방식에 관한 연구
가. 온실가스 배출량 할당에 관한 Ecofys 연구
나. 온실개발권 방식에 관한 SEI 외 기관의 연구
다. 선진국의 감축의무 할당에 관한 유럽위원회 연구
라. 부속서 I 국가의 상응한 감축노력에 관한 네덜란드 환경청 연구
마. 주요 배출국의 감축의무, 행동, 지원 차별화에 대한 OECD 연구
바. 기타 온실가스 감축의무 관련 주요 제안
2. 측정?보고?검증에 관한 연구
가. 측정?보고?검증에 관한 퓨센터 연구
3. 협상결과물의 법적 형태에 관한 연구
가. 협상결과물의 법적 형태에 관한 퓨센터 연구
제4장 국가 간 온실가스 감축목표 할당 시나리오 분석
1. 주요국 온실가스 배출 관련 지표 현황
2. 국가 간 감축목표 할당방법
3. 시나리오별 감축목표 할당결과
가. BAU 대비 삭감률
나. 2005년 대비 삭감률
다. 1990년 대비 삭감률
라. BAU 대비 배출집약도 삭감률
마. 2005년 대비 배출집약도 삭감률
바. 1990년 대비 배출집약도 삭감률
4. 감축목표 할당에 따른 경제적 비용
5. 한국의 시나리오별 삭감률
가. 시나리오별 삭감률
6. 감축목표 형식에 대한 대안과 특성
제5장 전망 및 대응방향
1. 코펜하겐 회의의 성과와 추후 협상 전망
2. 국제 온실가스 감축의무 협상 대응방향

참고문헌
부록 1: 코펜하겐 합의문(Copenhagen Accord)
부록 2: 주요국의 온실가스 배출현황 및 감축정책
Abstract

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