국제환경규범의 내생적 결정과정에 관한 연구

Title
국제환경규범의 내생적 결정과정에 관한 연구
Authors
황욱
Co-Author
황석준; 김미진; 조장율
Issue Date
2006-12-30
Publisher
한국환경정책·평가연구원
Series/Report No.
연구보고서 : 2006-10
Page
69 p.
URI
http://repository.kei.re.kr/handle/2017.oak/19249
Language
영어
Abstract
This study presents the political economics models to explore the political landscape of special interest groups influencing the government’s decision making process for implementing international environmental standard. Starting with the popular menu-auction types of lobbying frameworks in the literature, the study extends its researching scope to multi-principal and multi-agency based international interest group politics and its hybrid case in order to bring the interaction of the relevant interest politics to the fore. Within a specific factor model of international trade, we compare the political equilibrium outcomes in different institutional frameworks which can be feasible in the sense of recently growing role of environmental groups. In the benchmark, the two governments do not cooperate and the unilateral implementation leads to environmental standards that are too lax. Cooperation between the two governments can internalize the negative externality associated with unilateral policy making. This framework is more elaborated by incorporating the case of clean technology transfer between countries, which can benefit mutually both the donor and the recipient countries. More importantly, it is shown that cooperation between like-minded interest groups in different countries generates an identical result obtainable in the negotiation between the two governments. It is found that comparative static analysis using simulations provides some supporting evidence for the findings in the political economics models.

Table Of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Related Literature
III. The Economy
1. Technology
2. Individual Preference
IV. Political Economics Models: Special Interest Group Politics
1. SIP 1: Domestic Interest Group Politics
2. SIP 2: International Negotiation with Lump-sum Transfer
3. SIP 3: International Negotiation with Clean Technology Transfer
4. SIP 4: International Interest Group Politics
5. SIP 5: Asymmetric International Interest Group Politics
V. The Comparative Statics Analysis
1. Efficiency of the Abatement Technology
1.1. Changes in Emission Intensity Standard
1.2. Changes in Global Pollution
1.3. Changes in Pollution Generating Production
1.4. Changes in Social Welfare
2. Marginal Effect of Foreign Emission to Transboundary Pollution
2.1. Changes in Emission Intensity Standard
2.2. Changes in Global Pollution
2.3. Changes in Pollution Generating Production
2.4. Changes in Social Welfare
3. Marginal Disutility of the Environmentalists on the Transboundary Pollution
3.1. Changes in Emission Intensity Standard
3.2. Changes in Global Pollution
3.3. Changes in Pollution Generating Production
3.4. Changes in Social Welfare
VI. Concluding Remarks
References
Appendix
1. Definition and characterization of equilibrium of SIP 1
2. Definition and characterization of equilibrium of SIP 2
3. Definition and characterization of equilibrium of SIP 4
4. Definition and characterization of equilibrium of SIP 5
Abstract in Korean

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